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Abstract A speciﬁ c economic and social realignment can be observed in Mongolia nowadays. 
Due to the rapid transformation in the last two and a half decades, the mentality and way 
of life of Mongolian people have also changed to a great degree and a speciﬁ c national or 
nomadic ideology has appeared and gradually strengthened, which has become one of the pillar 
of national identity. This ideology is shared in many respects by Mongolians, living not only in 
Mongolia, but China and Inner Asia too.
In the economic environment the Mongolian society is changing at an accelerated speed. 
The urban population is getting far from the nomadic way of life and has started to follow 
behavioural models that are very diﬀ erent from the traditional patterns. With the regression of 
nomadism one of the fundamental constituents of the Mongolian culture seems to disappear. 
Although in the last 25 years Mongolians have increasingly adapted to the globalized culture, 
the tradition of Genghis has not totally vanished, what is more, nowadays it revives. The need 
for independent cultural identity is getting stronger. It plays a role in elaborating economic 
strategies that are adaptable to the changed environment. It can be observed, for example, in 
turnout of shamans in the towns, in the changes of the Buddhist Church’s social functions or in 
the “pretended” nomadic lifestyle around the main destination of tourism.
Keywords: Mongolia, nomad traditions, social changes in Mongolia, national traditions, 
national and/or nomadic ideology
A unique economic and social realignment can be observed in Mongolia today as a result 
of the rapid changes occurring in the course of the two decades following the political 
transition, leading to a signiﬁ cant transformation in both the mentality and lifestyle of 
its people. In parallel, a characteristic nomad ideology has also gradually emerged, and 
while this has grown to become a strong pillar of Mongol national identity, it has also 
divided the Mongol population into distinct groups – not only within the present borders 
of Mongolia, but also in the surrounding territories of Central Asia.
Opportunities for Mongolia are greatly inhibited due to its geographical circumstances. 
Wedged between two much larger neighbours – Russia and China – both of which are 
notably stronger nations in terms of their economic power and populations, Mongolia 
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has signiﬁ cantly less economic and, to a certain extent, political mobility, which has also 
been reﬂ ected in Mongolian history until now. In a political sense, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the subsequent transition taking place during the 1990s as well as the 
normalization of relations with China have created a new environment. Economic growth 
in China since the end of the 1980s has been both a blessing and a curse for Mongolia, 
meaning that in spite of important structural changes its previous economic dependence 
on COMECON has partially remained, albeit shifting in the direction of China.
Mongolian political life over the last 25 years has seen changes that cannot be 
experienced in any other post-Socialist or ex-Soviet satellite nation in Asia. Even by 
European standards, Mongolia today is a working democracy that has undergone a 
spectacular economic and social transformation. Consequently, it can surely no longer 
be regarded as a country where there is any validity to the image that the lifestyle of its 
people has remained unchanged since the time of Genghis Khan. Nevertheless, the most 
signiﬁ cant changes have taken place over the last quarter of a century. Social, economic 
and political processes in Mongolia during various periods since the 17th century have 
been greatly inﬂ uenced by its two neighbours, beginning with the Qing Dynasty, which 
lasted for more than 250 years, followed by Russian (Soviet) inﬂ uence throughout 
much of the 20th century, frequently in keeping with prevalent relations between the two 
larger powers. No signiﬁ cant social transformation occurred in the country from the 13th 
century up to the end of the 19th, and in this sense no decisive change can be attributed to 
the Soviet period after 1921 either.
It is undoubtedly a fact that Mongolian nomadism today partly continues to follow 
centuries-old traditions, making Mongolia one of last countries – if not the only one – 
where traditional nomadic pastoralism is still practiced in its original form. At the same 
time, this lifestyle is rapidly being supplanted, to the extent that the economic stability 
of the country has come under a certain threat while the nation is simultaneously facing 
new economic and social challenges brought on by its rapidly growing urban population. 
This process is not limited merely to economic consequences, however. Apparently, the 
disappearance of the nomadic lifestyle also means that a traditional pillar of Mongolian 
cultural tradition is disappearing as well. In contrast, even though Mongolians have 
over the past twenty years increasingly adapted to the inﬂ uence of “Western” consumer 
society – often indirectly conveyed to them through the “Oriental” ﬁ lter of Korea, Japan 
and Manchu-Chinese traditions have not completely vanished and are in fact currently 
experiencing a kind of renaissance.
SOCIAL CHANGE
The last decade of the 20th century brought sweeping changes in global politics, and 
thus in Mongolia as well, enabling the country to open towards the world after more 
than seventy years of political isolation. The borders of Mongolia were opened at a time 
when the growing eﬀ ects of globalization were gradually beginning to transform the 
entire world. The internet revolution and a new market environment were also having 
a strong impact on other countries and societies, but the transformation in Mongolia 
was particularly explosive. Due to its political environment and closed borders, the 
country had previously experienced very little change and at an extremely slow pace. 
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A certain modernization did exist, strictly controlled from above, but its impact was 
only felt by a narrow layer of society – and was therefore largely unsuccessful. For this 
reason, the nomadic pastoralism and livestock herding typical of the region for centuries 
remained in a signiﬁ cant portion of the country in spite of decisive, ideologically-based 
governmental attempts at cultural transformation. The latter had already begun during 
the 1930s in keeping with the government’s anti-religious ideology (Tൾඅൾ඄ං 2011:32–
33), but its true cultural impact could not be discerned until the middle of the century. 
Although the forced overshadowing of national traditions in Mongolia was not initiated 
with methods as drastic as those used in China during the period from 1966–76,1 the 
prevalent government ideology and system of political alliances dictated that Mongolians 
be integrated within a foreign regime via the repression of national traits.
These eﬀ orts, however, have merely resulted in a situation where post-transition 
Mongolian society is having to face the challenges of globalization while reconﬁ guring 
its basic cultural traditions. Moreover, this must now be accomplished in a period of 
extremely intensive economic and social transformation. In the new economic and 
social environment of the post-Soviet period, the mention and revival of Mongolian, 
or “nomadic” traditions not only entails the reconstruction of Mongolian culture, but 
may also present a unique economic solution to current challenges. Hereafter, I will 
examine individual aspects of this social and economic transformation as well as the role 
of religion in Mongolian society. 
While the structures of the traditional nomadic lifestyle are apparently disintegrating 
under the eﬀ ects of the new political and economic environment, two distinct social 
groups have gradually emerged. In Mongolian cities – and primarily in the capital – one 
group is living an entirely settled lifestyle adapted to urban economic circumstances, 
including those who increasingly see living abroad (not necessarily in an “urban” setting) 
as a means to achieve their existential goals. Their aim is to settle and work in Asian 
countries with better economic conditions – mainly South Korea and Japan. China is a 
less attractive destination, partly due to prejudices arising from misinterpreted national 
consciousness, historical tradition and nationalism – mostly in Chinese cities – despite 
the fact that a signiﬁ cant Mongolian minority can be found living in the territories 
bordering Mongolia. I will return to this special issue later in this study.
An outstanding number of young people living in cities are following a new 
trajectory completely divergent from the traditional Mongolian model. For them, the 
fashion, music and lifestyle dictated by the global culture of the United States or major 
economic centres in Asia are the example of choice. They are gradually losing their 
connection with Mongolian traditions, rejecting the example represented in the way of 
life their parents and grandparents followed. As a consequence, migration is a growing 
tendency, primarily among young urbanites moving abroad to study or work, and who 
are being replaced by new arrivals from rural communities. The depopulation of rural 
  1 The Cultural Revolution was introduced by events in the fall of 1965 – the ousting of the minister of 
culture and his undersecretary – but the movement took hold in the summer of 1966. Minor intervals 
notwithstanding, it lasted for a decade until the death of Mao Tse-tung and resulted in a severe 
political and social crisis. According to individual sources, more than 36,000,000 people were put on 
trial and 750,000 – 1,000,000 among them were murdered (Gൾඋඇൾඍ 2001:501–503; MൺർFൺඋඊඎඁൺඋ 
– Sർඁඈൾඇඁൺඅඌ 2006:262).
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areas and the disappearance of traditional lifestyle can largely be attributed to this trend. 
Half of Mongolian society today lives in cities, with the population of Ulaanbaatar 
drastically increasing over the last decade. Residents of the Mongolian capital during 
the 1990s numbered around 700,000. By 2010 the registered population had increased 
to over one million (Sඓංඅග඀ඒං 2010a) and has steadily continued to grow since then.2 
This phenomenon has been clearly visible from year to year in the growth of ger (yurt) 
districts built by settlers on the hillsides surrounding the city, which have continued to 
expand and are now extending to the far side of the hills in the area to the north of the 
capital.3 Over the past few decades, it has become a common habit among local urban 
dwellers to maintain smaller rural homes near the city, usually in the form of yurts, 
where they live from spring to autumn, only returning to their city residences during the 
extremely cold winter months. This acquisition of space has been simpliﬁ ed by zoning 
laws stipulating that all Mongolian citizens have the right to fence oﬀ  a speciﬁ ed area for 
their own use, which has led to the development of a special system of “summer homes” 
or yurts in the outlying areas beyond the residential districts surrounding Ulaanbaatar.4
This situation has radically changed in the years following the transition, especially 
in the last decade and a half, which has seen the number of new settlers increase far more 
rapidly than the number newly constructed ﬂ ats – which those moving in from rural 
areas were often unable to aﬀ ord.5 Taking advantage of the aforementioned regulations, 
many people have simply chosen to fence oﬀ  an area of a few hundred square meters as a 
mode of settlement in the capital. As a consequence, the vicinity of Ulaanbaatar has been 
populated by yurts and wooden cottages standing on plots surrounded by wood fencing. 
These settlements are provided with electricity, but running water and sewers are often 
lacking, making it impossible to provide residents with appropriate hygienic conditions. 
Due to the inherent features of the territory, it is especially diﬃ  cult to establish a suitable 
infrastructure as there are no designs guaranteeing the establishment of an appropriate 
street grid. Many yurts have been washed away by heavy summer rains in recent years, 
and these catastrophes have claimed the lives of numerous residents, which means that 
ﬁ rst generation settlers have by no means found the living circumstances that prompted 
them to leave their rural homes (Jൺඇඓൾඇ – Bൺඍ-Oർඁංඋ 2011).
At the same time, it is also important to mention additional pressing factors. 
Unfortunately, Mongolia today still lacks suitable veterinary treatment for the livestock 
that provide a living for the rural population, which means that in some cases a 
signiﬁ cant portion of these animals are vulnerable to extinction. Furthermore, as there is 
no established feeding system, and given the fact that open-air grazing can only ensure 
the circumstances necessary for survival and reproduction under certain environmental 
conditions, mass death among livestock during the winter continues to occur. 
  2 According to the latest data from the Ulaanbaatar Bureau of Statistics, the registered population of 
the capital in 2011 was 1,206,000. http://www.ubstat.mn/ (accessed January 16, 2012)
  3 Data from 2013 indicates that the population in the capital had reached 1,226,991. http://www.
infomongolia.com/ct/ci/208/137/Ulaanbaatar%20General%20Information (accessed April 28, 2015)
  4 In addition to establishing temporary homes and “summer residences”, many have also used this 
opportunity to build storage facilities and wholesale warehouses connected to their businesses.
  5 Estimates by the Asian Development Bank suggest that the annual number of new arrivals to 
Ulaanbaatar is up to 40,000. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/dafcddc6-9bfc-11e4-a6b6-00144feabdc0.
html (accessed April 13, 2015)
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This often leads to complete ﬁ nancial disability for some families, who are then forced 
to leave their pastures behind.6
While suitable work opportunities for large numbers of ﬁ rst generation urban dwellers 
have been scarce for years, the pace of migration to cities has continued to increase up to 
the present day. Rising unemployment has also led to signiﬁ cant social tension, a fact made 
clearly evident by the riots that took place in the summer of 2008 (Sඓංඅග඀ඒං 2010a) – and the 
simultaneous depopulation of rural areas may also mean the end of traditional Mongolian 
nomadic pastoralism. It is no accident that there is now growing discourse regarding 
ways to integrate the nomadic lifestyle within a 21st century economic environment. This 
issue gives rise to numerous problems (Cൺආඉං 2011). Some are already envisioning the 
“end” of nomadism (Hඎආඉඁඋൾඒ – Sඇൾൺඍඁ 1999) while others have described nomads 
as a gradually marginalizing group (Dඒൾඋ 2001). Nomadic conditions cannot provide an 
appropriate standard of education, which can only be achieved in cities, and this in turn 
reinforces migration. It is only in the rarest of cases that young people who have moved 
to cities from rural environments in order to study in secondary schools or universities 
return to their original communities, which is the second major reason for the rapid 
growth of urban populations and the depopulation of rural areas. Limited opportunities for 
education also call attention to another fundamental problem. In the decades prior to the 
political transition, it was common for nomads to send their children to boarding schools 
located in rural municipalities in order to obtain basic schooling. Secondary and higher 
education were a narrow privilege ﬁ nanced by the state. Although education is available to 
a much broader strata today, noteworthy institutions of higher education are only located 
in the capital city and in one or two rural centres – for example Khowd or Darkhan. 
Without the availability of major scholarships, university education requires signiﬁ cant 
ﬁ nancial sacriﬁ ces from nomadic peoples, who often do not possess large amounts of 
money. A nomadic lifestyle can ensure a living for large families comprising up to three 
generations, yet rarely provides a sizable income for the families involved. More precisely, 
the infrastructural and market conditions necessary for generating ﬁ nancial income from 
the sale of goods produced in the context of a nomadic lifestyle are at present still not 
accessible to every nomad. Consequently, it is only the members of a relatively narrow 
strata who are able to have their children educated in cities. 
NEW ECONOMIC MODELS
The growing demand for ﬁ nancial income in rural areas has also resulted in the appearance 
of new strategies, manifest in the emergence of new enterprises, such as goat breeding in 
Kashmir, for which there is an increasing demand, and the wholesale purchase of other 
animal products. The latter does not necessarily entail an environmental burden, and so 
can easily be combined with a nomadic lifestyle. The former, on the other hand, is already 
  6 Such mass extinction took place in the winter of 2001–2002 and more recently in 2010. Reports 
on the latter indicated that more than two million animals had died, with the complete destruction 
of entire livestock herds in some territories. “Severe winter kills two million livestock.” Montsame 
News Agency, Ulaanbaatar, February 11, 2010. http://www.montsame.mn/index.php?option=com_
news&mt=normal_news&tab=201002&task=news_detail&ne=799 (accessed January 16, 2012)
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having a signiﬁ cant visible impact on territories in southern Mongolia. The number of 
goats in the northern area of the Gobi Desert has grown to a point where desertiﬁ cation 
has accelerated and traditional nomadic livestock husbandry is no longer viable.
Strategies for obtaining direct ﬁ nancial income have primarily developed near major 
centres of tourism, where nomads have established small “open-air museums” for visiting 
tourists. While these families are ostensibly conducting their traditional way of life, their 
primary source of income is the money they earn by providing tourists with photo-ops and 
other services. One of the most visited tourist destinations in Mongolia is Lake Khöwsgöl 
(Khalkha: Xöwsgöl nuur), the shores of which are populated – in the spring and summer 
months – by the aforementioned nomad families, who “control” speciﬁ c territories among 
themselves. There is frequent “cartel activity”: guests regularly hosted in yurts built by 
certain entrepreneurs, or speciﬁ c families oﬀ ering photo opportunities to foreign tourists 
who are always transported by chauﬀ eurs familiar with the territory. Families providing 
such tourist spectacles have seemingly not rejected their nomadic lifestyle – grazing their 
animals in their winter abode and then moving to their “summer residence” by the lake. 
Their main source of direct income, however, is the photo-ops they sell to both Mongolian 
and foreign visitors for pre-negotiated fees, allowing visitors to take pictures with them 
or with their animals. On such occasions, friction between locals and other Mongolians 
who have arrived at the lake as tourists is not uncommon. Rural travel destinations are 
popular among urban Mongols nowadays, but while such trips may seem to be simple 
excursions, they are often infused with a special emotional content, and their aim is not 
only to provide “settled” Mongolians with an opportunity to relax outside of the city or 
to visit their nomad relatives in the countryside. The Mongolian plains and the traditional 
Mongolian way of life today are prominent elements of Mongolian national identity, and 
so Mongolians living in urban environments show far greater pride and enthusiasm in 
visiting the rural territories of their country than can be observed among city dwellers 
in other nations. For such urban visitors, paying fees to be photographed with families 
camped by Lake Khöwsgöl constitutes a decidedly negative experience, even if they 
are being photographed with reindeer or horses. Comments like the following can be 
frequently heard: “It’s my country. Why should I have to pay for it?”
Such environments have also given rise to the appearance of self-entitled “business 
shamans” who no longer play the traditional role of shamans in their communities and 
who have not become sacred leaders in the traditional way. Such individuals have merely 
recognized “market opportunities” and perform various rituals for travelling visitors – 
often based on information they have learned from books or by word of mouth.7 If they do 
these activities well, it is often diﬃ  cult to distinguish them from authentic shamans, which 
means they are even able to provide their audiences with a sacred experience. In local 
communities, however, self-proclaimed shamans fulﬁ ll an entirely diﬀ erent role than their 
authentic counterparts who achieved their status in accordance with sacred traditions. In 
fact, it can be said that they play no important role at all and do not even attempt to do so. 
They have simply taken advantage of developed stereotypes in connection with nomads 
and conduct shamanistic activities merely as a source of income.
  7 A similar theme is addressed by anthropologist Laetitia Merli in the documentary film Shaman tour, 
which premiered on October 7, 2011 at the 10th annual ISSR conference in Warsaw.
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This process correlates with a phenomenon that has also been observed outside of 
Mongolia in certain territories of China and Siberia. The general demand for sacral 
fulﬁ lment in the post-Soviet age of free religious practice has seen an increase in the 
number of fake shamans working to satisfy this demand, in connection with whom 
adherence to tradition would be diﬃ  cult to verify. Although researchers claim that it is 
also possible to ﬁ nd shamans who can be regarded as authentic, it is likely that many 
individuals are performing rituals that they have reconstructed based on the accounts 
published by these same researchers. Whether taking place in cities or in rural settings, 
this phenomenon raises many new questions. In the period of revival arising as a result of 
free religious practice over the last two and a half decades, followers of both Buddhism 
and shamanistic tradition have been attempting to reconstruct and reassert the role of 
Mongolian traditions forced into the background or eliminated during the time before 
the political transition. This is an easier process in the case of Buddhism thanks to 
written source material and religious centres abroad, where a young generation of Lamas 
have now for several decades been able to train themselves in keeping with Mongolian 
Buddhist traditions originating from Tibet. In addition, it has taken nearly two decades to 
re-launch religious education in Mongolia, which has now developed education centres 
that are also able to provide suitable training for monks.
With regards to shamanism, which lacks written traditions, the same process has 
proven to be far more complex. On one hand, Buddhism has signiﬁ cantly limited shaman 
activity since the beginning of the 18th century – especially in central territories – which 
means that shamanistic traditions only survived among Mongolian groups living in 
peripheral regions, including Darkhats, Buryats and western Mongols. The impact of 
anti-religious movements during the 20th century was far more drastic in these territories, 
leaving very little or practically no basis for the reconstruction of traditions. The lack of 
written sources had two consequences. Firstly, it was only possible to reconﬁ gure the 
role and function of shamans in a traditional way in areas where shamans or shaman 
families had survived the more than 70 years of socialist rule preceding the political 
transition. Secondly, an increasing number of “self-proclaimed” shamans riding the tide 
of “neo-paganism” familiar to western societies as well began to engage in shamanistic 
practices for ﬁ nancial gain, often using the earlier work of researchers to establish their 
own systems. As was typical of the new socio-economic circumstances, they often 
moved to cities, where there was a concentrated demand for their services. In contrast to 
earlier times, it is not uncommon today for individual shamans to practice in shamanistic 
centres, attracting potential clients before setting out to establish private practices. Given 
this unique market environment, some shamans engage in a form of self-promotion, 
publishing books about their own activities or about shamanism in general – thereby 
creating an illusion of academic credibility and making sure to emphasise that they 
are also practitioners. In this way, audiences intrigued by shamanism and shamanistic 
traditions, who obviously have a sensitive commitment to the topic, often help to increase 
the clientele of the given authors.
While sacred traditions, especially Buddhism, have become a pillar of Mongolian 
national identity, ﬁ nancial considerations were not ignored among representatives of 
dogmatic religious circles either. In the wake of the recent Buddhist revival in Mongolia, 
there are obviously many who have taken on a monastic way of life based on personal 
conviction, but in an urban environment fraught with unemployment there are also 
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individuals who merely view joining a monastery as a means to ensure a livelihood. 
The gradual reconstruction of the religious education system over the past twenty years 
has led to partial success in alleviating this problem, but it is doubtful that it can be 
fully eliminated (Sඓංඅග඀ඒං 2010b).8 Even so, a certain restructuring can also be observed 
in recent years. While the ﬁ rst decade after the political transition showed a gradual 
increase in the number of lamas and monasteries, currently there is an apparent decrease 
in the number of monks, and so it is likely that those who are choosing this way of life 
today are only doing so out of personal commitment.
Simultaneously, the economic conditions created by the introduction of a market 
economy have enabled a small strata of Mongolians to accumulate a vast amount of 
wealth. Typically consisting of individuals living in urban centres, this strata has not 
generated income via traditional economic means and has primarily acquired its wealth 
through the private bank sector established following the transition, through privatized 
commercial networks and the developing mining sector, the latter of which has only 
emerged over the last twenty years and which has never been characteristic of historical 
Mongolian economic perspective.9 The Mongolian language has already formed a new 
expression in reference to members of the ultra-rich strata who ﬂ aunt their wealth. They 
are called Shin Mongol (Khalkha: šine Mongol), meaning “New Mongolians” – a term 
which carries an obvious pejorative connotation in a Mongolian society struggling with 
vast social inequality. The expression denotes those who mimic foreign behaviour, 
forsaking respect for Mongolian traditions, and in light of opinions voiced in everyday 
public discourse, the term has in fact become synonymous with a social group prone to 
corruption and responsible for the deterioration of Mongol society.10
The Mongolian language reacts very quickly to such changes in public thinking. While 
an increasingly strong emphasis on Mongolian national traditions as an answer to socio-
cultural crises is clearly observable, the emergence of social groups who are sceptical of 
the former can also be discerned. There are communities, primarily consisting of young 
people, who consciously mock Mongolian traditions and do not adhere to accepted forms 
of social communication e.g. they fail to show appropriate respect for elders, which 
constitutes a fundamental breach of traditional Mongolian social norms. They are referred 
to by the term “rural Indian” (Khalkha: nutgiin indian),11 which clearly has a negative 
content. This group is straining the framework of the traditional rural nomadic lifestyle 
while oﬀ ering no clear alternative for the acquisition of income. It remains to be seen 
  8 During the religious revival after the political transition, one of the biggest problems facing the 
Buddhist church was that religious education had been dismantled in the period of religious 
persecution. As a consequence, underqualified lamas were put in charge of many monasteries, which 
often resulted in the degradation of these institutions. In the course of reconstructing the education 
system over the last twenty years, this problem has been considerably alleviated through assistance 
from education centres, which are often operated by Tibetan emigrants.
  9 According to Mongolian Head of State C. Elbegdorj, 90% of Mongolian GDP today is produced by 
the private sector. http://www.jst.go.jp/astf/document2/en_33doc.pdf (accessed April 23, 2015)
10 Ádám Halász is currently conducting research on related themes under the guidance of the author in 
the context of graduate work in the Mongolian Studies Program of the Central Asian Faculty at the 
Eötvös Loránt University (ELTE) in Budapest.
11 Ádám Halász has not published on the basis of his fieldwork in 2006. I thank him for his consent to 
allow use of his data.
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whether this is merely rebellion against tradition for its own sake or the development of a 
fundamentally new social group conducting a non-urban way of life.
In contrast to these negative social phenomena, a new concept has gradually emerged 
which views the preservation of Mongolian tradition as a means to reinforce the economic 
and cultural development of the country, an idea which arose practically in conjunction 
with the political transition.
NATIONAL TRADITION
It is peculiar that after the political transition it was not the opposition, but the political 
oﬀ shoot of the governing party that managed to build the newly resurfaced symbols 
of Mongolian nationalism into its rhetoric. This launched a conscious traditionalism 
that has been adopted by practically all players in Mongolian public life today, which 
means that Mongol traditions and national symbols have now become constant tools of 
political discourse. It is characteristic that the preservation of national heritage as the 
basic foundation for a stronger Mongolia was a central theme in the opening speech 
given by current Mongol President Ts. Elbegdorj (Khalkha: C. Elbegdorǰ) in 2011 at the 
10th International Congress of Mongolists.
The Mongolian population today is not uniform with regards to either its ethnic or its 
linguistic composition. Numerous theories have been developed in connection with the 
formation of the Mongolian language (Rൺආඌඍൾൽඍ 1912; Pඈඉඉൾ 1960), none of which will 
be dealt with in detail here, but it can be ascertained that among the population living 
in Mongolia today the Khazak, Khoton, Tuvan and Catani ethnic groups (Sඈආൿൺං 1998) 
belong to the Turkish branch of the Altaic language family while a larger portion of the 
population speak languages belonging to the Mongolian branch. This can be further 
broken down into dialects spoken by western, central and eastern groups (Tඎආൾඇ 2004). 
Linguistic diversity notwithstanding, and in light of our present theme, it is more 
interesting to focus on examining the ethnic composition of Mongolians. The earliest 
known source on this subject is the 13th century literary work The Secret History of The 
Mongols (Lං඀ൾඍං 1962), which chronicles the heritage of Genghis Kahn and provides 
the basis for the present day sense of Mongol identity. Numerous articles have analysed 
the language and culture of Mongolian ethnic groups (Nൺർൺ඀ൽඈඋǰ 1963; Bൺൽൺආඑൺඍൺඇ 
1965; 1987; 1996; O඄ൺൽൺ 1987). Based on these, it is possible to claim that Mongolians 
today can also be grouped on the basis of ethnicity into one of the three large linguistic 
categories listed above – western, or Oirats, central (Khalkha) and eastern. It is important 
to emphasise linguistic and, in a certain sense, ethnic diversity here because it is in this 
context that nomadic and Genghisid tradition are a unifying factor. 
State ideology prior to the political transition did not beneﬁ t the independent 
manifestation of diﬀ erent ethnic groups. As the consequence of a process lasting since 
around the 17th century, this continued to reinforce the predominance of the Khalkha 
peoples, which also resulted in the development of the literary Mongol language 
based on the Khalkha dialect. The political transition therefore created a new situation 
in this sense as well. While Mongols had previously taken into account ethnic origin 
in the course of personal communication, during the reorganization of administrative 
procedures it was suggested that ethnic origin should also be registered on personal 
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documents. Although this procedure was not introduced, it can be recalled that when 
attempts were made to do so during the 1990s, there was a sudden increase in the 
number of people who declared themselves to be of Borjigid descent, directly placing 
their origin in the Genghisid tradition. It should also be mentioned that around the same 
time it was not uncommon for young people in urban environments to proudly use the 
term “pure Khalkha” (Khalkha: ǰinxene xalx) when asked about their origins. While 
this could certainly be a natural answer, the inherent pride suggests a possibility that for 
young urbanized Mongols the expression also symbolizes a connection with urban life 
and modernity as a value.
In accordance with the ideology of the Soviet period, mention of the great Mongol 
Empire, or Genghis Khan – as a symbol of the Mongol state, independence and power – 
was not acceptable in the prevalent political environment. The historical role of Genghis 
Khan was blurred more as a result of suppression than falsiﬁ cation of history. It is no 
accident that when Mongolian independence was declared, the founder of the Mongol 
state became one of the most important themes in Mongolian culture, public discourse and 
historical research. Innumerable books have been published dealing with the Great Khan’s 
life and his role in history, making him the symbol of Mongolia, although his personality 
has been somewhat degraded as a result. Genghis Khan’s name has also become a well-
known commercial trademark outside the borders of Mongolia. A wide variety of products 
have been named after him, ranging from beer and vodka to travel agencies. His portrait 
adorned Mongol banknotes issued after the political transition, and the international airport 
in Ulaanbaatar is also carries his name today. Moreover, his personality enjoys a unique 
respect outside of today’s Mongolia as well.12 A sacred Genghis Khan cult has existed in 
Inner-Mongolia in the Ordos region since the 13th century (Bංඋඍൺඅൺඇ 2001), and legend 
holds that he was buried here. It is interesting to note that Genghis Khan has also been 
elevated to the pantheon of Chinese emperors as the founder of the Yuan Dynasty, which 
ruled in the 13th and 14th centuries, although Genghis Khan never intended to establish a 
dynasty. He wanted to rule China as a conqueror rather than sitting on the Chinese throne. 
The latter was achieved by his grandson, Kublai Khan, who did so in the face of growing 
hostility among the contemporary Mongol aristocracy. Naturally, Kublai is remembered 
today as one of the greatest rulers in Mongolian history – his statue stands beside that of the 
great founder in front of the Mongolian Parliament – but judgement by his contemporaries 
was by no means uniformly positive. 
It is intriguing that increased attention to the preservation of Mongolian national 
traditions today in the territories of Inner Mongolia – naturally due to favourable political 
changes – has unfortunately not brought Mongolian peoples living on opposite sides of 
the border closer to one another.13 In fact, the reverse is true. Recent years have indicated 
a peculiar kind of opposition, which is rarely voiced, but which is nevertheless present in 
public thinking. Nowadays, a portion of the Mongolian population, typically the urban 
12 Surprisingly, one of the reasons for the relative urgency of re-christening the airport in Ulaanbaatar is 
that Kazakhstan was also planning to name one of its airports after the Great Khan, which Mongolia 
naturally could not allow to happen.
13 This is also evident in the maintenance of the Genghis shrine, a gigantic Inner Mongolian museum 
built in 2008 in Hohhot (“Blue City”, the royal seat founded in the middle of the 16th century by the 
Tumen Mongol Altan Khan, today the centre of the Chinese Autonomous Province of Inner Mongolia).
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segment, is especially hostile towards those in Inner Mongolia. China can be regarded as 
the most signiﬁ cant commercial and investment partner in Mongolia today, and nearly 
5.6 million Mongol speakers – almost double the population of Mongolia – are currently 
living within her borders.14 To an outsider, this fact would constitute an opportunity 
to expand economic cooperation, but in everyday life it has actually not strengthened 
relations between the two countries. The anti-Chinese sentiment that can be observed 
today in Mongolia – which is clearly visible in the communication taking place between 
young people bickering with each other on social network sites – also presents Inner 
Mongolians in a negative light. I have heard more than once in Ulaanbaatar that Mongol 
people living south of the Gobi Desert cannot even be considered Mongolian because 
they are “Chinese”. At the same time, when travelling in Inner Mongolia, on several 
occasions I experienced locals qualifying Ulaanbaatar “city Mongols” with a simple 
dismissive wave of the hand, designating an extremely negative critique. When I asked 
about the reason for this opinion, I was told that “those are not real Mongols anymore”: 
they live in the city, they engage in commerce, they imitate the West, and so cannot be 
considered the true heirs of Mongol tradition – rural Mongolians perhaps, but deﬁ nitely 
not those in Ulaanbaatar.
To the outside observer, it would seem that a certain rivalry has developed between 
the two groups, based on the preservation of Mongol and nomadic traditions. Both sides 
are driven by a uniquely interpreted national consciousness, which is understandable 
when we examine the circumstances. Preserving and practicing their cultural traditions is 
imperative for Mongolian people living in China as it is the only way for them to preserve 
their identity within the overwhelmingly Han Chinese majority.15 For the inhabitants of 
The Republic of Mongolia, it is the reinforcement of national identity and the preservation 
of traditions that bring a guarantee of social stability, and it is here that we return to the 
unequal socio-economic circumstances mentioned at the beginning of this study. 
In recent years, several publications have addressed the issue of whether a nomadic 
way of life can be integrated into the circumstances of the 21st century (Bඈඅൽ 2001; 
Eඇ඄ඁඍඎඏඌඁංඇ 2011). The answer is not obvious and also raises numerous economic 
issues that cannot be analysed here. Even so, there is an obvious government intention 
to keep the issue of national identity at the highest level of discourse. In addition to the 
aforementioned presidential speech, the opening of the 2011 International Congress of 
Mongolists contributed other interesting information as well. The event was not only 
dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the founding of the theocratic Mongol State, but also 
to the 90th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. From an ideological point of view, 
the latter does not correlate with the political course today, but Mongolians mark this 
event as the beginning of their separation from China, even if it cannot be dated as such 
14 The territory of Inner Mongolia comprises 1,200,000 square kilometres. Based on the census in 
2000, only 17.13% of those living here, approximately four million people, referred to themselves as 
Mongolian. Mongols can also be found living in Northeast China, in Qinghai, Gansu and Xinjiang.
15 A smaller factor contributing to this may be that according to current Chinese law minorities receive 
certain benefits in connection with childbirth, which are well known to be limited among Han 
inhabitants. 
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in legal terms.16 The two anniversaries and the date can be easily explained, but the fact 
that the event was timed to coincide with the 2220th anniversary of nomadic statehood 
demands further explanation. The fact that Mongolians link Mongol statehood to the 
establishment of the Asian Hun (Xiongnu) state17 (Vගඌගඋඒ 2003:35–38) proves that a 
conscious – and newly intensiﬁ ed – traditionalist concept exists at a governmental level, 
one in which the appearance of the nomadic state as ﬁ rst documented in Chinese sources 
as well as Mongol traditions are mentioned within a comprehensive system. It might be 
worth noting here that experts and spokesmen on the topic make a unique argument to 
the eﬀ ect that the appearance of Mongols in the Xiongnu Empire itself proves that there 
is no obvious counter-argument. We know that the ﬁ rst nomadic state and the ones that 
followed were – in a modern sense – a nomadic empire based on a loosely conﬁ gured 
system of multinational tribal alliances. Therefore, it is quite possible that those living 
under Xiongnu authority included peoples who spoke an early form of the Mongolian 
language. Based on Chinese sources, some researchers have dated their appearance as 
early as the 2nd century B.C., in the event that they spoke the Topak Mongol language 
used by the Sienpi (Xianbei) tribes that defeated the Xiongnu Empire and established the 
Wei Dynasty in North China between 386 and 538 B.C. (Vගඌගඋඒ 2003:46).
Within this system of rhetoric, the founding of the nomadic state (Xiongnu) and the 
appearance of nomadic traditions in the earliest written sources are gradually becoming 
a part of Mongol historical tradition. Since a signiﬁ cant part of the Xiongnu state lies in 
the territory of today’s Mongolia, this concept can easily be integrated in the viewpoint 
clearly illustrated by the following phrase: “The history of Mongolia, the history of the 
Mongol land” – which is a commonly used expression today.
A similar argument can be heard in connection with Mongolian cultural tradition and 
the history of the Buddhist religion, which constitutes another important pillar of Mongol 
national identity. In keeping with the accepted consensus among the academic community 
dealing with the topic, two Mongol Buddhist conversions are usually mentioned in 
relation to the spread of Buddhism in Mongolia – one in the 13th century and another from 
the 16–17th century. In recent years, however, “newer” conversions are said to have been 
discovered which characteristically seem to date farther and farther back in time. In this 
context, there is talk today of a Buddhist tradition that appeared in the territory of present 
day Mongolia from the 6–8th century, the Buddhism of the Kitan, who can indeed partially 
be traced to the territory of Mongolia today, but cannot be considered predecessors of 
Mongol Buddhism as there is a signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence between speaking about Mongol 
Buddhism and the Buddhism which appeared later in Mongol territories. Nevertheless, 
the aim in both examples is the same: to project religious and historical traditions as 
important elements of national identity as far into the past as possible. 
We do not intend to deal with the validity of the theory in connection with Xiongnu 
here (Pൾඅඅංඈඍ 1912; Lං඀ൾඍං 1970). At present, it is perhaps more interesting to mention 
that it is not only the Mongolian government who uses the possibility of Xionghu origin 
16 Republican Chinese troops were in fact exiled from Ulaanbaatar by Mongolians in 1921 with the 
help of the Soviet Red Army, but in a legal sense China did not officially recognize Mongolian 
independence until January 5, 1946.
17 The Xiongnu state was established by Tuoman and his son Maotun (Modu) at the end of the 3rd 
century, in the year 209 B.C.
ActaEthnographica2016.1..indb   208 2016. 09. 20.   12:09:15
209Lingering Nomad Ideology in 21st Century Mongolia
at a political level. Many researchers in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia are showing 
serious interest in this issue. The subject is experiencing a kind of renaissance today, and 
yet, surprisingly, it is not serving as a means to bring Mongols living on the two sides of 
the Gobi Desert together either. Government rhetoric on both sides incorporates the idea 
that nomadic peoples appearing in the region in the 4th century B.C. established the ﬁ rst 
nomadic state and that the nomadic people who Chinese sources ﬁ rst described in detail 
can be regarded as cultural predecessors of Mongolians. In spite of this, nothing is said 
about how Mongol peoples on either side of the border are related to one another. At the 
moment, it seems that distrust is only the observable arch spanning across the border.
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